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THE STATE OF UNIONS IN AMERICA:
"CHIPPING" AWAY AT THE UNION "BLOCK"
"Since .

1959, there have been only minor modifications in statu-

tory labor law. . . .It is time to consider overhauling the Wagner Act
[NLRA] . . . it is preferable for the major decisions to be made by

Congress, the branch accountable to the parties and the public."'

INTRODUCTION

With the passage of the National Labor Relations Act 2
("NLRA") in 1935, unions first derived the authority to represent
employees in the workplace. Despite opposition by both employers
and the courts to unions early in the labor movement,' the passage
of the NLRA enabled unions to survive in America. Recently, however, unions began losing the power they once derived from the
NLRA.
The very legislation which gave unions the authority to represent employees in the workplace is now being construed by the
courts so as to undercut union authority.' Congress enacted the
NLRA in an effort to give unions the authority to represent employees collectively. Congress intended the NLRA to assist and promote
union activity, not to contribute to its downfall.'
1. Mikva, The Changing Role of the Wagner Act in the American Labor Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1136 (1986) (Judge Mikva, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit). Mikva further stated that although the Wagner Act is not
dead or dying, the current problems of labor demands an additional remedy. Id. at
1139. "The remedy starts with the recognition that what was satisfactory in 1935 is
no longer enough. It is time to recalibrate the power balance between employers and
employees." Id.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982). The National Labor Relations Act is comprised
of the original Wagner Act which was amended by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 and
the Labor Management and Disclosure Act in 1959. See Comment, Plumbers and
Pipefitters: The Need to Reinterpret the Scope of Compulsory Unionism, 33 AM. U.
L. REV. 493 n.1 (1984).

3. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts'
initial opposition to labor unions.
4. Labor law, which primarily deals with employer/employee relations, is governed by the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), as amended. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141187 (1982). See Comment, Justice Brennan and Union Discipline Under the NLRA:
The Fight for Solidarity Impinges upon Individual Rights, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
127 n.1 (1986).
5. Currently, unions are becoming dissatisfied with the recent operation of the
NLRA and therefore, union membership is on the decline. See Van, Wezel & Stone,
Labor and the CorporateStructure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. ILL. L. REV. 73 (1988); Mikva, supra note 1, at 1123. There are various
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Despite Congressional intent to safeguard union power, recent
court decisions, interpreting various sections of the NLRA, have
continued to limit union authority under the Act.' It is the NLRA's
ambiguous language which has enabled the courts to reinterpret the
Act so as to "chip away" at unions' authority.7 Because the NLRA is
unclear on its face, the courts are left with the opportunity to reinterpret sections of the Act.
Specifically, courts are taking a new approach in interpreting
sections 8(b)(1)(A) s and 8(a)(3)' of the NLRA. Courts recently interpreted section 8(b)(1)(A) as prohibiting unions from fining strikebreakers, 10 whereas earlier courts approved of these fines under the -

Act." Today, the courts also take the view that section 8(a)(3) aureasons for the decline in union membership but one reason that stands out is that
union members are under the impression that the NLRA does not provide adequate
protection when they confront management. Mikva, supra note 1, at 1124.
6. For an analysis of these cases see infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
7. Some commentaries pose three different theories to explain the growth of
NLRA litigation and the increasing trend rendering the NLRA useless as a means of
union authority. Flanagan, NLRA Litigation and Union Representation, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 957, 963 (1986). The first view blames the litigation growth on the increase in
new regulations on labor relations. Id. The second view claims that the regional and
sectoral shifts in the distribution of the economy of labor is responsible for the increase. Id. The third approach takes the view that the growth is partially due to the
strategic interactions of labor, management, and the National Labor Relations Board.
Id. at 964.
8. Section 8(b)(1)(A) specifically states that it is an unfair labor practice for a
union or its agents to "(1) restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition
or retention of membership therein. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982).
9. Section 8(a)(3) states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer:
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the
United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a
labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is
the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as
provided in section 9(a), in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered
by such agreement when made, and (ii) unless following an election held-as
provided in section 9(e) within one year preceding the effective date of such
agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of
such labor organization to make such an agreement.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
10. See Pattern Makers League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985) (union could not
fine strikebreakers even though there was a contrary rule in the union constitution);
Auto Worker's Local 449 v. NLRB, 865 F.2d 791 (6th Cir. 1989) (union held to violate
section 8(b)(1)(A) by retaining provision in constitution restricting members' rights
to resign).
11. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of an earlier
court decision approving of unions' fining strike-breakers.
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thorizes agency shop agreements, 2 and therefore employees are only
required to pay the portion of union dues attributed to collective
bargaining.13 As illustrated in the following analysis, these decisions
4
are contrary to the legislative intent of the NLRA.1
If action is not taken to counter these recent reinterpretations
of the NLRA, the courts will effectively overrule the Act, section by
section, "chipping away" at what once was a strong union "block."'"
If the NLRA becomes unenforceable, employees will suffer great
hardships in their relations with employers. Once employees lose the
union, they lose their ability to bargain on equal footing with their
employer.'" The NLRA gives unions the power to improve working
conditions for employees through collective action.17 Without the
NLRA, unions will be unable to aid employees in collective bargaining. Therefore, employees will lose the ability to secure important
rights in the workplace.'
12. For an explanation of agency shop agreements, see infra note 96 and accompanying text.
13. See infro notes 102-04 and accompanying text for an analysis of recent
court decisions requiring proportionment of agency dues.
14. For the specific discussions regarding the legislative intent of sections
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(a)(3) see infra notes 75-80 and notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the need to amend the NLRA to prevent future
reinterpretations of section 8(a)(3) in a less favorable light to union activity, see infra
note 127 and accompanying text.
16. Unions use collective bargaining to obtain the following: higher wages for
union members, formal grievance procedures, protection from arbitrary discipline,

and more frequent break periods. A. GOLDMAN,

LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

130 (1984).
17. Collective action is more commonly referred to as collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is defined as "negotiation between an employer and organized employees as distinguished from individuals, for the purpose of determining by joint
agreement the conditions of employment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 239 (5th ed.
1979). Employers are required to collectively bargain with unions which are chosen by
the majority of the employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
Through collective action, unions play a vital role in labor relations, securing important rights for employees which they could not bargain for or obtain on their own.
Even under the NLRA, individual action against employers is not protected. Cf.
NLRB v. Office Towel Supply Co., 201 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1953) (concerted activity
does not protect individual complaints regarding working conditions even if other
members agree); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967) (the employee dealing individually must be advancing a condition of employment of mutual concern of all the employees). But see
NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971) (individual activity by an
employee will be protected as concerted activity if it is "looking toward group
action").
Individually, employees lack the bargaining power to secure important rights in
the workplace. "The right to bargain collectively is at the bottom of social justice for
the worker .. . the denial or observance of this right means the difference between
despotism and democracy." H. MILLS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFTHARTLEY 3 (1950) (quoting address by Sen. Wagner, May 8, 1937). "Union activity, by
its very nature, is group activity, and is grounded on the notion that strength can be
garnered from unity, solidarity, and mutual commitment. This concept is of particular force during a strike." NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213, 221 (1973).
18. The majority of the employees must vote for union representation. FlanaIN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 23:707

This comment will discuss the impact of unions in the United
States and the courts' recent trend toward limiting the unions'
power. Part I will examine the history of the union to emphasize its
importance on worker's rights in America. This part is divided into
three sections to illustrate the economic, political, and working conditions prevalent during the evolution of unionism. The first section
discusses the conditions before the development of the union. Section two explains the government's initial hostility to unions' organizing efforts. The third section examines the government's eventual embrace of unions which culminated with the enactment of the
NLRA.
In an effort to explain the recent attempt to break down the
union, Part II discusses the specific areas where the courts are limiting union authority. This part consists of two sections: The first section examines recent court decisions limiting intra-union discipline.
The second section discusses the collapse of the union shop into the
agency shop and "fair share" issues. Part III summarizes the effects
of these recent court decisions on the NLRA. Finally, Part IV proposes that Congress amend the NLRA to counter the courts' recent
treatment of unions.
I.

THE UNION: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A. Fertile Ground for Union Development
The Industrial Revolution served as the catalyst to the growth
of unions in the United States.' 9 The economic and political climate
of the era favored rapid business expansion. The government, eager
to see the United States become a highly competitive industrialized
gan, supra note 7, at 957. Union representation is dependent upon many factors in
addition to the outcome of elections. Id. at 958. Section 9 of the NLRA provides that,

"[riepresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes .... " 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). The NLRA historically had two faces, one was the "voice" or
industrial democracy face and the other was the economic face. "There was definitely
an industrial democracy (voice) motivation in its passage." Mitchell, Inflation, Unemployment, and the. Wagner Act: A Critical Reappraisal,38 STAN. L. REV. 1065,
1066 (1986). "Modern industrial relations courses tend to depict the Wagner Act as
primarily an effort to promote 'industrial democracy' through collective bargaining."
Id.
19. Most historians would predict that the Great Depression and the Industrial
Revolution would have put the labor union near extinction because of its growing
weakness in a time of unprecedented national prosperity. Raskin, Elysium Lost: The
Wagner Act at Fifty, 38 STAN. L. REV. 945 (1986). On the contrary, however, "the
severest economic collapse in the country's history had precisely the opposite impact
on the strength of the labor movement, even though unemployment reached levels
that condemned one-quarter of the work force to idleness." Id. In the 1930's, workers
joined unions by the millions, and mass production industries "found their private
armies of goons and labor spies feeble defense against the onrushing tide of unionism." Id.
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nation, allowed businesses to carry on virtually unregulated.2 Because the government was reluctant to interfere with business operations and employer/employee relations, employers were in a position
to take unfair advantage of their employees. In addition, employees
lacked the bargaining power to improve their working conditions.2
Inexperience in employment negotiation was one factor which
contributed to this lack of bargaining power.22 A second factor contributing to employees' inferior bargaining position was the absence
of job security.2 This was due in great part to the improvement in
transportation facilities. As transportation facilities improved, people were able to move about more freely.24 This, in turn, created
fierce competition for jobs. Local journeymen found themselves
competing with the flood of unskilled workers who were willing to
work for lower wages. Employers were not reluctant to displace the
higher paid skilled workers with unskilled workers.25
Employees soon realized it was necessary to join forces to
strengthen their bargaining position with employers. 26 Based on this
realization, skilled workers began organizing into groups in an effort
to deal with the employers collectively. This collective activity led to
the creation of associations now referred to as unions.
20. This is referred to as the "hands off" approach of government. Laissez-faire
"expresses a political-economic philosophy of the government of allowing the marketplace to operate relatively free of restrictions and intervention." BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 788 (5th ed. 1979).
21. Employees realized that individually they were powerless to bargain with
the employer because they were forced to compete with each other for wages. B. JusTICE, UNIONS, WORKERS AND THE LAW 1 (1948). Therefore, the employees did not have
the power to complain about the working conditions. Id. "First, the Wagner Act was a
piece of economic legislation, enacted as a direct response to the economic challenge
of the times: the Great Depression." Mitchell, supra note 18, at 1065.
22. See E. HERMAN & A. KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR RELATIONS 3
(1981). Another reason for the loss in bargaining power was that when workers became journeymen they bought their own tools. Id. However, when the Industrial
Revolution brought about machinery in the workplace, the journeyman and his tools
were no longer needed. Id.
23. When machines replaced tools, the skilled journeyman lost his freedom to
be his own boss. Id. at 3-4. This loss of freedom resulted in a severe decrease in the
worker's ability to locate work. Id.
24. See A. GOLDMAN, supra note 16, at 22 (labor law contributes its existence to
combined industrial development with territorial expansion).
25. "A higher union/nonunion wage differential creates incentives for employers
to substitute nonunion labor for union labor and for consumers to substitute products
made by nonunion labor." Flanagan, supra note 7, at 958.
26. Employees realized that individually, they were too weak to bargain with
the employers and that collectively, the employer would be forced to bargain with
them for fear that the company would suffer economic hardship if the employer was
required to replace all of the employees. E. HERMAN & A. KUHN, supra note 22, at 4.
27. A union is defined as "an organization of workers, formed for the purpose of
negotiating with employers on matters of wages, seniority, working conditions, and
the like. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1374 (5th ed. 1979).
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B.

The Unions' Reception by the Courts and Congress

Employers fought vigorously to prevent their employees from
acting collectively through unions.28 Given the United States government's desire to foster industrial growth, employers were able to
enlist the government's assistance in their attempts to squelch the
unions.2 9 This was initially achieved by bringing criminal conspiracy 0 charges against those employees engaged in collective
activities."'
In the early 1880's, the courts became active in repressing union
activity. Criminal charges were replaced with civil remedies as
courts began enjoining collective activity.2 Congressional approval
28. In early periods of development, unions were very unstable. B. MELTZER &
S. HENDERSON, LABOR LAW 2 (1985). Union organization was early defeated by employers in most cases. Id. One reason for the disappearance of union organizing early
on was the employers' initial hostility towards the employees who began the organization. Id.
29. The reason behind the government's initial allegiance with the employers
was due to the desire to build a better industrial America. Hartley, The Framework
of Democracy in Union Government, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 13 (1982). The United States
government wanted to be in a better position to compete with other countries in the
manufacturing of goods. Id. Consequently, the government refused to stifle such
growth by imposing regulations which would increase businesses' expenses and discourage
unions'
opinion
Barres,

companies from manufacturing goods. Id. The public resentment over the
adverse impact on the employers' success was a great influence on the public
that political action against worker groups was needed. Id. at 27. See also
The Origins of Modern Labor Law, 22 AM. J. EcON. & Soc. 279, 286 n.47

(1963).
30.

tivity. B.

Before 1850, the courts aided employers in their fight to suppress union acJUSTICE,

supra note 21, at 8. Employers and the courts resorted to the com-

mon law criminal conspiracy doctrine to keep the workers in line because it was diffi-

cult to replace skilled workers. A conspiracy is the combination of two or more people
to join together to harm society or other citizens. Id. Employees who joined forces to
change their working conditions was considered as serious of a crime as robbery
under criminal conspiracy laws. Id.
In 1806, the Supreme Court held in a conspiracy trial that "[a] combination of
workmen to raise their wages may be considered in a two-fold point of view: one is to
benefit themselves

. . .

the other is to injure those who do not join their society. The

rule of law condemns both." Commonwealth v. Pullis, Philadelphia Mayor's Court
(1806); 3 J. COMMONS & GILMORE, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY 59

(1910). See also E.

LIEBERMAN, UNIONS BEFORE THE BAR

3-15 (rev. ed.

1960); Nelles, The First American Labor Case, 41 YALE L.J. 165 (1931).
The courts began to take a more sympathetic view towards unions in 1842 when
the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that union activity was not per se a crime but
stated that courts should apply a means/end test to determine if the union's methods
were legal. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
For discussions of the criminal conspiracy doctrine applied to unions see generally W. SAMPSON, TRIAL OF THE JOURNEYMEN CORDWAINERS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
6-141 (1810); Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1922); Witte, Early
American Conspiracy Cases, Their Place in Labor Law, 35 YALE L.J. 825 (1926).
31. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of collective

activities including collective bargaining.
32. In the decision known as the Danbury Hatters case, the United States Supreme Court upheld a civil suit for treble damages against a union based on the theory that the union violated provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in promoting a
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of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 provided the courts with another vehicle to stifle union activity.33 Although Congress passed the
Sherman Act to prohibit businesses from restraining trade, the
courts applied the Act to unions, charging them with restraint of
free trade. 4
C.

The Change in the Government's Attitude Towards Unions
and the National Labor Relations Act

In the early 1900's Congress softened its view towards union activity.3 5 In 1914, unions won Congress' support through lobbying efforts.3 6 In an attempt to exempt labor unions from the Sherman
7
Anti-Trust Act, Congress passed the Clayton Anti-Trust Act
("CAA"). The CAA stated that "the labor of a human being is not
an article of commerce." 3 Because the CAA's language was unclear
in not specifically stating that unions were exempt from anti-trust
legislation, the United States Supreme Court was able to construe
3 9
the CAA narrowly.
In Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering,40 the Supreme Court held
boycott against a manufacturer who refused to recognize and bargain with the union
as if it were the employees' representative in collective bargaining. Loewe v. Lawlor,
208 U.S. 274, 283 (1908).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to address the issue of business restraint on trade, not union restraint.
34. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act was first upheld to apply to union activity in
Loewe v.Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). This is also referred to as the Danbury Hatters
case. In Loewe, the United States Supreme Court affirmed a civil suit awarding treble
damages against a union for violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in promoting a
boycott against a hat manufacturer who refused to bargain with the union. Id.
35. Due to the discontent of workers and the impact of their votes in government elections, Congress began softening its view towards unions. See B. JUSTICE,
supra note 21, at 11.
36. Organized labor obtained Congressional support after intensive lobbying efforts in 1914. Id. at 11. Due to these lobbying efforts, Congress passed the Clayton
Anti-Trust Act which was intended to exempt unions from the Anti-Trust laws. Id.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982). The Clayton Anti-Trust Act was Congress' attempt to
modify the Sherman Anti-Trust Act by exempting unions from the Anti-Trust laws.
Hartley, supra note 29, at 38. Congress intended to declare in the Clayton Act that an
employees' labor was not an article of commerce and therefore, courts lacked the
power to regulate labor activity through the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. See A.
GOLDMAN, supra note 16, at 48. Section 6 of the Clayton-Anti Trust Act specifically
states that:
[T]he labor of a human being is not a commodity. Nothing contained in the
anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under
the anti-trust laws.
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
38. See supra note 37 for the precise language of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act.
39. See Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
40. 254 U.S. 443 (1921). In Duplex, the Court held that a union's request to
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that the CAA did not exempt labor's collective activity from the
anti-trust injunction."' By failing to specifically state that all union
activity was exempt from the anti-trust laws, Congress gave the
courts room to interpret the CAA in a manner inconsistent with the
drafters' true intent.2
Unions finally won the battle, however, with the passage of the
Railway Labor Act ("RLA") in 1926."3 Congress enacted the RLA to
establish the rights of railroad employees to form and join unions.
Because Congress used very precise language,"" making its intent
clear, the Supreme Court was forced to uphold the drafters' intent
when interpreting the Act.4 5
potential customers to boycott the product of the employer and also a request that
the workers not install or repair that product, such pressure also affected employers
that were only indirectly related to the dispute. Id. Therefore, the Court held that the
action was properly brought under the Clayton Act to enjoin-the activity of the union
as it was in restraint of trade. Id. The Duplex Court held that the Clayton Anti-Trust
Act did not prevent injunctions against this type of union activity as it did relates io
interstate commerce. Id.
41. In refusing to exempt labor unions from injunctions under the Act, the Duplex court stated, "[b]ut there is nothing in the section to exempt such an organization or its members from accountability where it or they depart from its normal And
legitimate objects and engage in an actual combination or conspiracy in restraint of
trade." Id. at 469.
42. Because the language of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act was vague, the Supreme Court held that it did not intend to make unlawful the regulation of any activity that was provided, for in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. "However, the Clayton Act
was vaguely written and did not in plain language provide what'labor hoped for - that
is, an outright exemption. The Supreme Court proved unwilling to allow Congress to
legislate away its role as the protector of the status quo." B. JUSTICE, supra note 21,
at 11.
In retaliation to the Supreme Court's overruling of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act in
Duplex Printing,Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 to legislatively
overrule Duplex Printing. Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act to "take the
federal courts out of the labor injunction business." Marine Cooks & Stewards v.
Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369 (1960). For a discussion of the reasons the Supreme Court overruled Duplex Printing,see Comment, Labor Law,.55 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1012, 1022 n.85 (1987).
43. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982). Congress passed the Railway Labor Act to allow union activity in the railroad industry.
44. The purposes for the Railway Labor Act are:
(1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier
engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation onfreedom of associationamong"
employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the
right of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to provide for the complete
independence of carriers and of employees in the manner of self-organization
to carry out the purposes of this Act; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly
settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions;
(5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing
out of interpretation or 'application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules,,,
or working conditions.
45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
45. In Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. and S. Clerks, 281
U.S. 548 (1930), the United States Supreme Court upheld the Railway Labor Act
stating that Congress' power to protect the free flow of trade in interstate commerce
includes Congress' power to assure a means of settling labor-management disputes by
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After the passage of the RLA, Congress enacted additional legislation dealing specifically with employee rights to act collectively.
In 1932, Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act 4 which denied
' 7
federal courts the power to issue injunctions in labor disputes.
Congress also passed the Wagner Act 8 (now referred to as the
NLRA)49 in 1935. The NLRA mandated that employers bargain
with employee representatives.50
As union activity prevailed under the NLRA, Congress became
aware of the need for more comprehensive legislation which would
balance union, employer, and employee interests." In 1947, attempting to effect this balance, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley
Act 5" ("THA") as an amendment to the NLRA. The THA prohibited secondary boycotts by unions and gave employees the right to
protecting the right of unions to bargain collectively. Id.
46. Norris-LaGuardia Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65 § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (1932). The current version is located at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982). This anti-junction statute was
brought about because of the public's outcry for government to help unions secure
rights for employees in the workplace. Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades
Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921). "A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer . . . unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment . . . [u]nion was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with
their employer." Id. at 186.
47. In an effort to promote economic recovery in the New Deal era, President
Roosevelt passed the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933. This Act proposed to
regulate the prices and production of industry in an effort to provide an express departure from the anti-trust laws. See B. JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 14; Mitchell, supra
note 18, at 1071.
However, the Supreme Court interfered again with the government's attempt to
promote unionism by overruling the National Industrial Recovery Act, stating that it
permitted federal regulation of what the Court considered purely local issues.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The Court declared
the Act unconstitutional in Schechter only months before the Wagner Act (NLRA)
was adopted. Id.
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982).
49. The NLRA is often referred to as the Wagner Act after Senator Robert F.
Wagner who proposed it in 1935 to solely regulate union and management relations.
See A. GOLDMAN, supra note 16, at 52. See also Raskin, supra note 19, 945 (a historical look at the Wagner Act and the force of it today, over fifty years later).
50. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
to "refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to
the provisions of section 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5) (1982).
The United States Supreme Court upheld the NLRA in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Supreme Court for the first time held that Congress' power to regulate commerce included the power to regulate labor-management activity. Id.
51. See S. PETRO, POWER UNLIMITED - THE CORRUPTION OF UNION LEADERSHIP
246 (1959) for a discussion of the main objective of the Taft-Hartley Act of outlawing
monopolistic strikes and secondary boycotts by unions.
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1982). For a discussion of the Taft-Hartley amendments, see Mikva, supra note 1, at 1127. "Congress passed Taft-Hartley to counteract
what many saw as the excessive power of the post-Wagner unions. Id. The amendments allowed the government to use injunctions against unions, and outlawed closed
shops upon the awareness of the substance of collective bargaining agreements. Id.
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refrain from union activities. 53 Congress further amended the NLRA
with the passage of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 4 ("LMRA") to curb union corruption."
Today, the NLRA remains the core legislation regulating employer/employee relations. The NLRA gives employees the right to
form, join, or assist unions in collective activity, as well as the right
to refrain from such collective activity.5 6 These collective rights are
often referred to as section 7 rights.5 7 The union is an essential
mechanism through which employees have an opportunity to assert
their section 7 rights under the NLRA5

II.

SPECIFIC AREAS OF UNION BREAK-DOWN

Unions are presently suffering from a number of court decisions
which are effectively "chipping away" at the unions' authority to represent employees collectively. Part II of this comment analyzes two
specific areas of employer/union relations which the courts recently
addressed, which lay at the heart of the union break-down.
A.

Restricting Union's Authority to Discipline Members

Section 8(b)(1)(A)5 s of the NLRA forbids unions from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their section 7
rights to exercise collective activity, provided the labor organization
has the right to "prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisi53. Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act over President Truman's veto, to
make closed shops illegal, and to outline for the first time union unfair labor practices. Raskin, supra note 19, at 949. Organized labor created a harsher name for the
Taft-Hartley Act, referring to it as the "Slave Labor Act." Id. at 949.
54. Congress passed the LMRA in 1959 which is commonly referred to as the
Landrum-Griffin Act. Raskin, supra note 19, at 950. Congress also passed the Landrum-Griffin amendments in an attempt to protect innocent third parties from union
activity. See Comment, supra note 42, at 1033-34.
55. Congress passed the LMRA in order to curb the corruption in some unions.
Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor Law: Union
Membership Resignations and Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1268, 1319 (1988).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
57. Id. The union derives its authority to aid employees in securing their section 7 rights under the NLRA through section 9. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982). The
representatives voted by the majority of the employees "shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment." Id.
58. Without the union, the employees would not have a means to collective action. Medoff, The Public's Image of Labor and Labor's Response, 3 DET. C.L. REV.
609 (1987). The union speaks as the "voice" of all the employees so that they are not
required to deal with the employer on an individual basis. Id. Unions have two faces,
one is the monopoly face and the other is the voice face. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF,
WHAT Do UNIONs Do? (1984).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
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tion or retention of membership therein." 0 Courts recently narrowed the unions' authority to prescribe such rules in disciplining
their members. 1 Specifically, courts have limited the unions' power
62
to impose fines on those members who resign during strike periods.
These recent court decisions contravene the Supreme Court's
initial interpretation of the section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso as it deals
with unions' intra-disciplinary powers. In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co.,3 the United States Supreme Court held that unions have
the authority to fine their members for refusing to participate in an
economic strike. 4 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan 5 noted
60. Id. Section 8(b)(1)(a) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for a
union to restrain or coerce employees in exercising their rights under section 7 "provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
61. For a discussion of these cases see Comment, Section 8(b)(1)(A) from AllisChalmers to Pattern Makers' League: A Case Study in JudicialLegislation, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1409 (1986) (hereinafter Case Study).
62. Union discipline in strike resignations is an important area in the field of
labor law. Many legal commentators have discussed the recent changes in this area of
labor law. See generally Abraham, supra note 55, at 1268 (examination of the tensions between individual rights and theories of collective action in the context of
union resignations and strikebreaking); Comment, supra note 4, at 127 (analysis of
union discipline and Justice Brennan's theory of refusing to regulate internal union
affairs as collective group); Comment, supra note 61, at 1409 (examination of the
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Amendments); Note, A Union's Right to Control Strike-Period Resignations, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 339 (1985) (examination of Pattern Makers' and the controversy over union discipline); Wellington, Union Fines
and Workers' Rights, 85 YALE L. J. 1022 (1976); (examination of Allis-Chalmers and
union discipline).
63. 388 U.S. 175 (1967). In Allis-Chalmers, the Union represented employees of
two Allis-Chalmers' plants voted for an economic strike. Id. A few of the union members crossed the picket lines and worked during the strike. Id. The union fined those
strikebreakers in amounts of $20 to $100 according to the collective bargaining agreement which required each employee to become, and remain a union member. Id. The
strikebreakers refused to pay the fines, therefore, the union sued them in state court.
Id. In response, Allis-Chalmers brought unfair -labor practice charges against the
union for violating section 8(b)(1)(A). Id. The NLRB held that the discipline imposed
by the union on the strikebreakers was valid under the section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso. Id.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the Board's decision by holding that Congress did not intend section 8(b)(1)(A) to prohibit the imposition of fines on union
members who refuse to honor an authorized strike. Id. at 178-95.
64. 388 U.S. 175 (1967). The Court held that it is essential to labor policy that
the union be able to protect against erosion of its members and status through reasonable discipline of those members who violate the union rules. Id. "That power is
particularly vital when the members engage in strikes." Id. at 181. See, e.g., Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1951); P. TAFT,
THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONS 117-80 (1954).
65. Justice Brennan authors more labor law decisions than any other United
States Supreme Court Justice. See Dorman, Justice Brennan: The Individual and
Labor Law, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1003 (1982). See also Comment, supra note 4, at
127. "[An examination of Justice William J. Brennan's treatment of internal union
affairs reveals a primary concern for unions and union self government." Id. at 127.
"Justice Brennan has generally upheld union attempts to discipline union members,
balancing a union's need for authority over its members and national labor policy."
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that because the economic strike is a vital weapon to the union in
achieving its goals, it is essential that all members participate in the
strike activity. 6 Brennan further stated that in order to insure
membership participation, it is necessary67 that the union have authority to "fine or expel strikebreakers.

Eighteen years after Allis-Chalmers, the Supreme Court struck
a major blow to the unions' ability to fine strikebreakers in Pattern
Makers League v. NLRB. s The Court in Pattern Makers held that
a union could not fine employees for resigning from the union before
or during a strike regardless of a contrary rule in the union constitution."9 The Court further held that the rule forbidding resignation
before or during a strike is not a "rule with respect to the retention
of membership

70

protected under the section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
broadly interpreted the Pattern Makers holding in Auto Worker's
Local 449 v. NLRB. 7 1 In Auto Worker's, the court held that the
union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) by maintaining a provision in the
union's constitution restricting members' rights to resign and for refusing to accept strikebreakers' resignations. 7 2 The court further
held that section 8(b)(1)(A) prohibited any restriction on a union
Id.
66. "The economic strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in labor's
arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms, and '[t]he power to fine or expel
strikebreakers is essential if the union is to be an effective bargaining agent ....
"
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181 (1967) (quoting Summers, supra
note 64, at 1049).
67. Id. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
unions' right to fine strikebreakers.
68. 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
69. Id. In October of 1976, the League, a national union comprised of local associations, adopted an amendment to the union constitution which provided, "No
resignation or withdrawal from an Association or from the League shall be accepted
during a strike or lockout, or at a time when a strike or lockout appears imminent."
Id. at 97. Subsequent to adopting this amendment, two local unions went on strike
and 11 of the union members tendered resignations and returned to work, refusing to
participate in the strike activity. Id. When the union sought to fine those strikebreakers, the Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers' Association filed unfair labor practices
charges under § 8(b)(1)(A) against the League. Id. at 98. The United States Supreme
Court held that § 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits unions from fining employees who tender resignations during strike periods. Id. at 115. "Therefore, imposing fines on employees for
returning to work 'restrain[s]' the exercise of their § 7 rights." Id. at 101.
70. Id. at 110. See supra note 8 for the specific language of § 8(b)(1)(A). "Accordingly, we find no basis for refusing to defer to the Board's conclusion that League
Law 13 is not a 'rule with respect to the retention of membership' within the meaning
of the proviso." Pattern Makers, 473 U.S. at 110.
71. 865 F.2d 791 (6th Cir. 1989). In Auto Workers, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the unions who maintain a provision in its
constitution which restricts the member's right to resign violates § 8(b)(1)(A). Id. at
797. Furthermore, the court held that any restriction on a union member's right to
resign restrains and coerces the member and impairs the ideal of voluntary unionism.
Id.
72. Id.
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member's right to resign.73
These decisions are an unwarranted restriction on unions' rights
to intra-union discipline for three reasons. First, legislative history
indicates that section 8(b)(1)(A) was not intended to restrict unions'
authority to prohibit members from resigning and fining them for
doing so. Second, unionism is a democratic process where all members are required to abide by the majority decision to strike. Third,
it is unfair to permit union members to forego participation in the
strike but reap the benefits such as wage increases which result from
the strike.
The Taft-Hartley amendments' 74 legislative history reveals that
7
Congress did not intend to interfere with internal union affairs. 1
More specifically, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress
did not intend to prohibit unions from fining their members for resigning. 7" This is evidenced by the changes made before Congress
enacted the bill. The House bill contained a provision which made it
an unfair labor practice 77 for a union to deny its members the right
79
to resign. 78 The Senate, however, failed to adopt this provision.
73. Id. The provision in the union constitution in Auto Workers specifically
states: "A member may resign or terminate membership only if s/he is in good standing, is not in arrears or delinquent in the payment of any dues or other financial
obligation to the International Union or to the Local Union and there are no charges
filed and pending against her/him." Auto Workers Local 449 v. NLRB, 865 F.2d 791,
793 (6th Cir. 1989).
74. Section 8(b)(1)(A) was added to the Wagner Act through the Taft-Hartley
amendments. These amendments to the Wagner Act were passed after much heated
debate. See SENATE COMM. ON LABOR

AND

PUBLIC WELFARE, S.

REP No. 105, 93D

Cong., No. S 42-8 2D Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 (1974).

75. Id. The right to refrain from union activity provided for in section
8(b)(1)(A) was not intended to give the NLRB the right to interfere with and regulate
internal union affairs, including the imposition by unions of disciplinary fines against
members who violate the union constitution. Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95,
119 (1985) (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting); NLRB v. Boeing
Co., 412 U.S. 67, 71 (1973); Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 428 (1969).
76. "Because a majority of the Board has interpreted the terms of the NLRA in
a manner inconsistent with the congressional purpose clearly expressed in the legislative scheme and amply documented in the legislative history, the Court's deference is
misplaced." Pattern Makers, 473 U.S. at 130-31. (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., and
Marshall, J., dissenting).
77. Section 8(b) of the NLRA governs union unfair labor practices. See 29
U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982).
78. The House bill contained a detailed "bill of rights which declared that it is
an unfair labor practice for a union to deny any of its members the right to resign
from the union at any time." H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 6443
(1947).
79. The Senate bill generally proposed that it is an unfair labor practice to "restrain" or "coerce" employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights, but did not
specifically set forth any particular employee rights. Id. It also refused to adopt the
Houses' provision declaring it an unfair labor practice for unions to deny members
the right to resign. Id. The Taft-Hartley Act contains the Senate's general language.
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982).
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Therefore, the fact that the Senate considered this provision and
expressly excluded it demonstrates that Congress did not intend
section 8(b)(1)(A) to be used as a means of preventing unions from
fining members for refusing to strike. 0
The second reason unions should possess the authority to fine
members for resigning before or during a strike is imbedded in the
principle of democracy underlying unionism."' The union process is
democratic.82 A majority of a company's employees must vote in
favor of union representation." Similarly, a majority of employees
must vote in favor of a strike.84 Because the majority of employees
choose to strike, all. the members should abide by that majority decision. It is unfair to both the union and the other striking members
to allow some members to "jump ship" when the going gets rough.
The third reason for allowing unions to discipline members for
resigning is characterized as the "free rider" problem. 5 It is unfair
to allow union members to refrain from striking by resigning, and
then reap the benefits from the strike." These ex-union members
are "free riders. 8s7 They do not suffer the same economic hardships

as their fellow employees during the strike, yet they enjoy the same
benefits derived from the strike. 8 The restriction of fining strikebreakers is just one area where the courts are undermining the authority of unions.
80. If Congress intended it to be an unfair labor practice for the union to fine or
otherwise discipline members for strike-breaking activity, it would have adopted the
House bill proposal. Because Congress decided not to specifically state this type of
union discipline as prohibited, it is obvious that Congress intended to permit unions
to fine members for refusing to strike.
81. See Hartley, supra note 29, at 13 (discussion of union government from a
policy perspective); Cook, Dual Government in Unions: A Tool for Analysis, 15 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 323 (1962).
82. Under section 9 of the NLRA, in order for a union to represent employees
for the purposes of collective bargaining, it must be elected "by the majority of the
employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
83. Section 9 of the NLRA provides: "Representatives designated or selected
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes .... 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
84. Dorman, supra note 65, at 1003.
85. For a definition of the "free rider" problem, see infra note 87.
86. These benefits are those obtained by the union for the employees in the
collective bargaining agreement. The strike is used as an economic weapon, forcing
the employer to meet the union's demands regarding wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. See Dorman, supra note 65, at 1023.
*87. Free riders are those non-union member employees who do not join the
union or pay dues, but benefit from the unions' collective bargaining. NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 741 (1962). Congress passed section 8(b)(1)(A) with the
intent to deal with the free rider problem by allowing union security agreements. Id.
at 740-41.
88. Id. at 741.
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B.

The Agency Shop and the Burden of "FairShare"
Requirements

Another area where the courts are undermining union authority involves union security agreements 8 9 Security agreements are agreements between the union and the employer which condition employment on joining the union." Section 8(a)(3)9 1 of the NLRA gives
labor organizations the right to bargain with employers for these security agreements. 2 That section specifically states that, "the act
shall not prohibit the employer from agreeing with the union to require as "a condition of employment membership therein." s
This "membership" requirement can be interpreted as either of
two types of security agreements: union shop or agency shop. 4 A
union shop requires, as a condition of employment, that the employee join the union and that he begin paying dues after working
for thirty days. 5 An agency shop agreement does not require the
employee to join the union. However, employees are required to pay
union fees and dues. 6
89. Union security agreements are, in effect, agreements which mandate union
membership on all the employees even if they did not vote in favor of union representation. "A union security agreement is a negotiated contract provision requiring some
form of union membership or payment to a union as a condition of employment." B.
JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 98.
90. See infra note 95 for a short discussion of three different types of union
security agreements.
91. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
92. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA specifically provides:
(a) it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- (3) by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States,
shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act
as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day of such agreement....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (emphasis added).
94. The union shop is the most restrictive type of union security allowed under
section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. UNION SECURITY, CHECKOFF, AND HIRING ARRANGEMENTS,
[Oct.] Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 660, at LRX 730:301 (October, 1988). The United
States Supreme Court has also interpreted section 8(a)(3) as allowing agency shops.
NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 743 (1963). The court held that employment
could be conditioned upon membership but membership only required the payment
of dues. Id.
95. Union shop agreements require employees to join the union within a certain
period from time of hiring. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 639, 641-42
(1976). There are three types of union security agreements: (1) the closed shop where
only union members are hired; (2) the union shop where the employee must join the
union within a period of time; and (3) the agency shop where the employee must pay
union dues without having membership in the union. Comment, supra note 2, at 493
n.5.
96. An agency shop agreement conditions employment on the paying of union
dues. NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1962). For a discussion of the

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 23:707

When first construing section 8(a)(3), the courts interpreted
that proviso to authorize the union shop. 7 This changed, however,
in 1962 when the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. General
Motors" held that the section 8(a)(3) proviso authorizes the agency
shop, rather than union shop security agreements." The Court held
that interpreting the proviso to authorize agency shops furthers the
intent of Congress by requiring all employees to pay for bargaining
activity. 00 The Court reasoned that "membership" as used in the
8(a)(3) proviso, only referred to paying dues, not to actually joining
the union. 101
10 2
In the more recent case of Communication Workers v. Beck,
the Supreme Court broadened the General Motors holding by stating that under an agency shop agreement the employee is only required to pay dues for those activities directly related to collective
bargaining.10 3 The Court reasoned that although the intent of secagency shop, see generally Cantor, Uses and Abuses of the Agency Shop, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 61 (1983).
97. Prior to NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 733 (1962), courts construed
the section 8(a)(3) provisos to only allow the union shop, not the agency shop agreements. The Supreme Court ended the confusion of whether section 8(a)(3) authorized
the union shop or the agency shop in General Motors. Comment, Communication
Workers v. Beck: Supreme Court Throws Unions Out on Street, 57 FORDHAM L. REV.
665, 670 (1989). Therefore, after the Court interpreted section 8(a)(3) as authorizing
the agency shop, the question remained as to whether union expenditure of nonunion
fees for non-collective bargaining purposes violated the non-members' right to free
speech under the first amendment. Id.
98. 373 U.S. 733 (1962).
99. Id. at 742. The Supreme Court held that the section 8(a)(3) proviso conditions employment only on the payment of initiation fees and monthly dues. Id. "It is
permissible to condition employment upon membership, but membership, insofar as
it has significance to employment rights, may in turn be conditioned only upon payment of fees and dues." Id. See Radio Officers' Union v. Labor Bd., 347 U.S. 17
(1961). It is evident from the legislative history that Congress clearly intended union
security agreements to only authorize the compelling of paying union dues and fees.
Id. at 41.
100. NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 740 (1962). Congress realized that
a union security agreement was necessary to make employees pay the cost of obtaining collective bargaining agreements. Id. A representative sample of agency fee
cases holding that section 8(a)(3) authorizes agency shop agreements include: Public
Serv. Co. of Colorado v. NLRB, 89 N.L.R.B. 418 (1962) (requires union members to
pay to the union $2 a month for support of the bargaining unit); Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1961) (section 8(a)(3) merely disclaims a national hostility towards closed shop or other forms of union-security agreements); Algoma Plywood Co.
v. Wisconsin Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1960) (the proviso to section 8(a)(3) affirmatively
protects the maintenance of membership agreement).
101. General Motors, 373 U.S. at 743.
102. 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988).
103. Id. at 2655. In Communication Workers, employees who did not join the
union brought suit challenging the union's agency agreement because the union used
the agency fees for purposes other than collective bargaining. Id. at 2645. The employees contended that the expenditure of these fees for lobbying for labor legislation
and participating in charitable and political events violated the union's duty of fair
representation and the first amendment. Id. at 2645. The Supreme Court held that
the expenditure of the agency fees beyond those necessary to finance collective bar-
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tion 8(a)(3) was to afford unions protection under security clauses,
this goal is achieved by requiring employees to only pay those dues
related to collective bargaining agreements.'0 4 Thus, nonunion employees only had to pay their "fair share"' 0 5 of the union benefits.
This comment asserts that the fair share requirements proposed
in Communications Workers are an unwarranted limitation on the
unions' section 8(a)(3) rights to security. First, section 8(a)(3)'s legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended to authorize
union shop rather than agency shop security agreements. 00 The legislative history further demonstrates that Congress did not intend to
limit the unions' use of collected dues.'0 7 Second, some union activities, while indirectly related to collective bargaining, result in improved working conditions.'0 8 Third, requiring unions to account for
costs directly related to collective bargaining is unrealistic and
places an undue burden on unions."0 9
gaining agreements violated the duty to fair representation and the employee nonmember's first amendment rights. Id. For an analysis of the Communication Workers
decision, see Comment, supra note 97, at 665; Note, Section 8(a)(3) Limitation to
the Union's Use of Dues-Equivalents: The Implications of Communication Workers
of America v. Beck, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1567 (1989).
104. Id. at 2656-57. "We conclude that section 8(a)(3) . . .authorizes the exaction of only those fees and dues necessary to 'performing the duties of an exclusive
representative of the employees in dealing with the employees in dealing with the
employer on labor-management issues.'" Communications Workers, 108 S. Ct. at
2657 (quoting Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984)).
105. In order to remedy the free rider problem, Congress intended that employees be required to pay for those expenditures which are reasonably related to the
purpose of performing the duties of the bargaining representative. Communication
Workers, 108 S. Ct. at 2652. In holding that an agency shop agreement only provides
for paying those dues directly related to collective bargaining, the Supreme Court
looked to both the decision in International Assoc. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740 (1960) and the legislative history of § 8(a)(3). Communication Workers, 108 S.
Ct. at 2648-53. In Machinists, the Supreme Court interpreted section 2 of the Railway Labor Act as prohibiting a union, over the objections of a nonmember to expend
compelled agency fees on political causes. Id. at 2648. Because the Railway Labor Act
and the NLRA are similar, the Court in Communication Workers applied the Machinists reasoning to the NLRA. Id. at 2648-49.
Second, the Communication Workers court held that the legislative history of
the NLRA provided that agency shop fees be expended only for collective bargaining
purposes. Communication Workers, 108 S. Ct. at 2652. The Senate Report which accompanies the Taft-Hartley Act states that such a provision "remedies the alleged
abuses of compulsory union membership . . . .yet makes possible the elimination of
the 'free rider' and the sharing of the burden of maintenance by all of the beneficiaries of union activity." Hearings on H.R. 7789 Before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 253 (1950). The Communication Workers court held that this language means that Congress only required that
nonmembers, agency fees be allocated to activity directly related to collective bargaining. Communication Workers, 108 S. Ct. at 2651.
106. See supra note 95 for an explanation of union security agreements.
107. See infra note 110 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative
history of section 8(a)(3).
108. See supra note 105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the directly
related test.
109. For a further discussion of this burden placed on the union, see infra note

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 23:707

Both the plain language and the legislative history of section
8(a)(3) support the argument that Congress intended security agreements to authorize union shops."' The clear language provides for
"membership" in the union which means actually "joining" the
union to become part of that organization."' In addition to the clear
language, the legislative history reveals a desire by Congress to abolish closed shops. 1 The legislative history never mentions the creation of agency shops."' Therefore, Congress did not contemplate
that courts use section 8(a)(3) to authorize agency shops as opposed
to union shops.
Furthermore, if Congress intended section 8(a)(3) to authorize
agency shops, it failed to specifically state how a union may use the
money it collects from its members. If however, Congress did intend
to authorize the agency shop, it is necessary to look to the legislative
history to ascertain how much of the union fees a person must
pay." 4 The legislative history reflects the fact that Congress considered adding a provision to the NLRA which would have prohibited
unions from spending dues for non-collective bargaining purposes."
122 and accompanying text.
110. In adopting section 8(a)(3) Congress intended it to cover two purposes: (1)
to prohibit closed shop agreements which conditioned hiring on being a union member; and (2) to deal with the "free rider" problem. See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 6 (1947). The plain meaning of the term "membership" stated in the
statute requires an employee to join the union, not merely pay dues. See Comment,
supra note 97, at 672.
Furthermore, the debates never mention the idea of agency shop agreements,
they were only concerned with abolishing the closed shop. "Under section 8(a)(3), the
closed shop is abolished, and a man can get a job with an employer and can continue
in that job if . . . he joins the union and pays dues." See 93 CONG. REc. 4886 (1947)
(statement by Senator Taft) (emphasis added). Because the history requires joining
and paying dues, Congress intended the union shop, not the agency shop. See also
Hopfi, The Agency Shop Question, 49 CORNELL L. REV. 478, 484 (1964).
111. 29 U.SC. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
112. Algoma Plywood Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations, 336 U.S. 301,
307-11 (1949). A closed shop security agreement provides that only union members be
hired to work for that particular "closed shop." Id.
113. See supra note 110 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress'
failure to mention agency shop agreements as permitted union security agreements
under section 8(a)(3).
114. It is important to note that the American Arbitration Association has
promulgated rules for an impartial determination of union fees. American Arbitration Association Rules for Impartial Determination of Union Fees, [Oct.- Dec.] Labor Arb. (BNA) No. 88 G-501 (June 17, 1987).
115. The legislative history of section 8(a)(3) reveals that Congress was aware of
unions' use of the political arena to obtain benefits for workers. See United States v.
UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1957); H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80TH CONG., 1st Sess. 4 (1947).
The House bill, which the Senate did not adopt, contained a bill of rights for workers
which had a provision declaring that "[m]embers of any labor organization shall have
the right to be free from unreasonable . . . financial demands of such organization,"
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
Therefore, the fact that Congress specifically considered adopting a provision to
make agency fees to apply only to collective activities, but decided not to adopt such
a provision clearly states that Congress did not intend nonmembers to only be re-
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However, Congress decided to only prohibit unions from spending
dues on federal elections, and not to limit the use of dues for lobbying and non-collective bargaining purposes."' 6 This clearly demonstrates that Congress did not intend section 8(a)(3) to forbid noncollective bargaining expenditures, except for those related to federal elections.
A second reason the so called "fair share" requirements are in
fact "unfair" goes to the heart of the "free rider" problem discussed
earlier. 17 Congress intended that section 8(a)(3) would prevent employees from receiving union benefits without paying for them."'
However, by holding that non-member dues can only be used to pay
for costs directly related to collective bargaining, the courts are allowing this to occur. The "directly" related"' requirement interferes
with the purpose underlying section 8(a)(3) by failing to recognize
that employees are greatly benefited from union activities which are
indirectly related to collective bargaining.2
For example, union funds spent lobbying for certain working
conditions, such as an increase in the minimum wage, are not considered by the courts as directly related to collective bargaining. 2'
However, in fact, an increase in the minimum wage does directly
affect collective bargaining. An increase in the minimum wage puts
the union in a better bargaining position for securing higher wages.
quired to pay for activities directly related to collective bargaining.
116. Section 304 of the LMRA prohibits the use of agency fees by unions in
connection with federal elections. LMRA, ch. 120, 61 STAT. 136, 159-60 (1947) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1982)).
117. For a discussion of the free rider problem, see supra note 87 and accompanying text.
118. "[M]any employers sharing the benefits of what unions are able to accomplish by collective bargaining will refuse to pay their share of the cost." S. Rep. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1947) Congress intended the amendments to the NLRA
to remedy the abuses of the closed shop but give employers and unions stability by
eliminating the "free riders." NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 741 (1962).
119. Communication Workers v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641, 2648 (1989). For an explanation why Congress did not intend to limit the amount of agency fees or "dues
equivalents," see Communication Workers, 108 S. Ct. at 2658 (Blackmun, J.
dissenting).
120. Some agency fee payers have argued that such expenditures do not allow
them to decide which political groups to support. E.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209 (1977); Buckley v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 496
F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974); Lykins v. Aluminum
Workers Int'l Union, 510 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Jensen v. Yonamine, 437 F.
Supp. 368 (D. Haw. 1977).
It is difficult to determine what expenditures only deal with the "core" of collective activity. This gray area includes union institutional expenses such as journals,
building union halls, unions' organizing costs, expenditures for community services
aimed at promoting union public relations, and maintenance of strike funds. Cantor,
supra note 96, at 77.
121. See Communication Workers v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1989) (union expenditures to lobby for political issues are not directly related to collective
bargaining).
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Therefore, what the courts classify as an indirect relationship is in
reality, directly related to securing favorable collective bargaining
agreements.
The third reason fair share requirements are unwarranted is the
burden placed on unions to account for their expenditures. Because
the courts failed to articulate guidelines for unions to follow, a great
deal of uncertainty exists as to the nature and detail of documentation necessary to account for time spent on collective bargaining. 2
Is the union required to keep track of every hour, minute, or second? Absent any workable guidelines, this places an undue burden
on union representatives. Furthermore, how does the union classify
the time spent recording time spent for collective bargaining?
Would the courts consider this directly or indirectly related to collective bargaining?
III.

THE EFFECT OF THE RECENT DECISIONS ON THE

NLRA

The recent court decisions construing sections 8(b)(1)(A) and
8(a)(3) are effectively working to break-down union authority.
Taken separately, the courts' recent interpretations of these sections
are insufficient to weaken unions' powers. However, when these decisions are combined, they are likely to have synergistic effects
which will lead to the eventual destruction of union solidarity12 s and
collective representation. If the courts are allowed to continue to
reconstrue the NLRA to undermine union authority, they will eventually render it a useless piece of legislation. Such court action is not
without precedent in the area of labor legislation. As previously
discussed, the Supreme Court virtually overruled the intent of the
Clayton-Anti Trust Act"2 when it failed to apply it to labor organizations as Congress had intended. Because Congress enacted the
Clayton Act to exempt labor organizations from the anti-trust laws,
the courts' contrary interpretations completely abrogated the legis122. In Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), the Supreme
Court held that a union's procedure for accounting for collective bargaining fees was
constitutionally inadequate because it failed to minimize risk that nonunion employees' contributions might be temporarily used for non-collective purposes. The Court
held that procedural safeguards are necessary to protect the employees' funds from
being allocated for non-collective purposes. Id. at 294. However, the Court failed to
specifically state what these procedural safeguards are.
The Chicago Teachers Union Court further held that although the union did not
have to provide the objecting non-members' with a detailed list of the expenditures,
the union was too slow in getting a decision by an impartial decision maker, and the
first two steps of the review procedure were inadequate. Id.
123. Solidarity is defined as when, "several persons bind themselves towards
another for the same sum, at the same time, and in the same contract .
BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1249 (5th ed. 1979).
124. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's overruling of the intent of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act.
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lative intent. This resulted from Congress' failure to use clear and
precise language when drafting the Act. The same is true of the
NLRA. The NLRA is vague on its face. Thus, the courts have begun
reinterpreting the Act so as to severely limit union authority. These
interpretations contravene the underlying reason for enacting the
NLRA - to safeguard union solidarity. 2 '
IV.

SOLUTION: CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

To prevent the courts from effectively overruling the NLRA,
Congress must amend and clarify the statute. 2 " Congress should
125. See supra note 123 and accompanying text for a discussion of the meaning
of union solidarity.
126. It is important to note that many commentators do not believe that there
is a need to prevent unions from collapsing. See M. REYNOLDS, POWER AND PRIVILEGE,
28 (1984); Kerr, Industrial Relations Research: A PersonalRetrospective, Industrial
Relations, May 1978, at 142; Strauss, Industrial Relations Research: A CriticalAnalysis, Industrial Relations, October 1978 p. 259. These commentators of the union assert that the breakdown will benefit society because unions stagnate both the economy and productivity in America. Id.
Those opposed to the union most frequently attribute such opposition to the
corruptness of unions. See Detroit College of Law Review's 1987 Labor Law Symposium on the State of the Unions: Perspectives on Organized Labor 3 DET. C.L. REV.
605 (1987). Generally, the public's image of the union is that they are run by dishonest and unethical leaders. Id. Many union leaders have been subject to criminal
charges due to the mismanagement of union funds. Id. Therefore, the general reputation of unions has been severely tarnished because of a few "bad seeds."
This author is of the opinion that the argument that unions are corrupt is overused and often without basis. Unions have a bad name due to the unethical behavior
of just a handful of union leaders. Congress has dealt with this problem by enacting
the Taft-Hartley Act which provides for the punishment of those who abuse union
power. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1982). Therefore, because only a few of the union leaders
are unethical, this is not reason enough to insinuate that all unions are bad. Even
though unions have some faults, they continue to serve employees who might suffer
without them.
Another major reason for the opposition to unions may be attributed to economist theories which blame inflation on union demands for wage increases. See Comment, Inflation, Unemployment, and the Wagner Act: A Critical Reappraisal 38
STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1986). These critics argue that the increasing cost of labor due to
union demands forces the price of labor up, and therefore, increases the price of
products. Id. Those opposed to unions also claim that the costs of collective bargaining and union strikes contribute to inflation. Id.
On the contrary, unions tend to stabilize inflation by keeping the wage rate at
expected levels. C. MOSER, LABOR EcONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 121 (1986). Most
union members receive a cost of living raise every year to keep up with the cost of
'goods., Id. Consequently, if it were not for the union and the cost of living raises,
employees would individually demand more money for their work, and the employer
would lose the predictability of.the prevailing wage rate and his overhead costs. Id.
A final reason for union opposition which is posed by this author is the recent
trend of employers to implement Human Resource Departments to take care of employee needs. Such departments may be used by employers to improve communication with employees in an attempt to improve the relationship with employees. C.
HUGHES, MAKING UNIONS UNNECESSARY 15 (1976). Another approach taken by employers to prevent' unions from entering into the picture is implementing employee
value systems. Id. at 43. Therefore, because the employer has realized the importance
of keeping employees content, anti-unionists believe that there is no need for the
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amend both sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(a)(3)' 27 to clarify the original
intent. " By clarifying congressional intent on the face of the Act,
Congress will prevent the courts from imposing their will on the future of unionism in America.
First, Congress should amend the NLRA to clarify the circumstances where intra-union discipline is permitted. Specifically, Congress should amend section 8(b)(1)(A) to clearly state that unions
are permitted to discipline their members for failing to abide by majority decisions. Congress could achieve this by amending the section
8(b)(1)(A) proviso to read: it shall be an unfair labor practice for a
union to restrain or coerce employees in exercising their section 7
rights "[p]rovided that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe and enforce its rules, including rules
against tendering resignations during strikes, or other union activities which are authorized by a majority vote." By adopting this, or
similar language, Congress will ensure that the courts will not misinterpret the Act's legislative history by declaring that unions cannot
fine their members for refusing to strike.'29
Second, Congress should amend section 8(a)(3) to expressly provide for the union shop. Section 8(a)(3) should state: Provided that
nothing in this Act shall prohibit the employer to bargain with the
union regarding as a condition of employment that the employee
must join the union after thirty days if that union was selected by
the majority of the employees. This language would make it clear
that section 8(a)(3) does not permit agency shops.'
third-party intervener, the union. Id. at 117.
This author believes that this third reason to abolish the union is also without
merit. The human resource departments of companies do not serve the employee in
the same manner as the union. People must not forget who signs the human resource
employees' checks. Because the company pays these people to deal with the other
employees, the companies' best interests are always the bottom line, not the employees' interests. This logic of human resource departments replacing the unions is as
unrealistic as putting the fox in charge of the hen house.
127. For a further discussion of the need to amend the NLRA see Mikva, supra
note 1, at 1135. "Even if the Act cannot cure all the sins of the world, this does not
mean that nothing can be done." Id.
128. If the statute is clear on its face, courts would not be afforded the opportunity to interpret it in an inconsistent manner. See Comment, Communications Workers v. Beck: Supreme Court Throws Unions Out on Street, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 665,
671 (1989).
129. For a discussion of the legislative history showing that Congress did not
intend to prohibit unions from fining strikebreakers, see supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
130. Congress must put the burden on the nonunion minority employee to determine which of the unions' expenditures specifically should not be paid for. This
burden should make it difficult for the nonmember because most union expenditures
by the union are in some form related to the collective bargaining process which the
majority of the employees voted the union to deal with. See Chicago Teachers Union
v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), for the Supreme Court's decision that the burden of
accounting for collective activity should be placed on the union.
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If Congress amends sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(a)(3), courts will
have to abide by the original intent. Thus, future courts will be prevented from further restricting union authority. Because the NLRA
has only been amended a few times since its passage in 1935, it is
time for a change to prevent the courts from effectively overruling
the statute altogether. In addition to fulfilling congressional intent,
amending the NLRA will prevent the inequalities which have resulted from the courts' recent interpretations of the Act. More specifically, Congress can help to eliminate the "free rider" problem if
sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(a)(3) are amended to require all the em"
ployees to abide by the union rules and pay for all union benefits.13
'
Also, the democratic process of unionism will be preserved because
the Act will require all employees represented by unions to adhere
to all majority decisions.1 2 Furthermore, NLRA amendments will
take the undue burden of accounting for collective activity ,off the
33
union.'
CONCLUSION

Unions must be preserved from their eventual collapse in the
same manner they achieved their authority at the outset - through
congressional legislation. If the NLRA is not amended in the near
future, unions may cease to exist. Without unions, the disparity between employee and employer bargaining power will greatly increase. Deprived of their collective voice, employees will again be
forced to bargain individually with employers for rights in the
workplace.
The remedy begins with Congress recognizing that the courts
are undermining the purpose for which the NLRA was enacted.
Subsequent to this recognition by Congress, it must inform the
courts of their diversion from the intent of the Act. To accomplish
this, Congress must amend the NLRA to send the message to the
courts that the United States will not allow the courts to destroy
union solidarity.
Rene L. Powell

131. Mikva, supra note 1, at 1136.
132. For Justice Brennan's contract theory of unionism see Dorman, supra note
65, at 1003.
133. For a discussion of the burden placed on unions to account for collective
bargaining activity, see supra note 122 and accompanying text.

